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ARGUMENT AND HUMAN DECISION-MAKING:

Teaching the Upper-Level Course
J. Robert Cox

One gains a striking perspective on tlie status of argumentation studies
in recent years by reviewing Gronbeck's 1972 survey of departments of
Speech Communication;
Scanning graduate catalogues from universities across the nation soon

makes one painfully awtu-e how little actually is being done with argument
and argumentation in our graduate programs.'

Gronbeck obserx'ed that, "Argument as a discrete subject matter receives
generally bare attention.

The scholarship, conferences, and curricula development in argumen
tation stiidies since Gronbeck's survey, by contrast, mark this as an enor

mously fertile area within our discipline. Key essays by Brockriede,'' Willard,' O Keelc,^ and McKerrow," among others, urged reconceptualization
of argument and "arguing" and closeK' scrutinized procedures that had
been used previously to analyze arguers' claims. Participants at the July
19/4 Task Force Assemijly of the National Developmental Gonference on
Forensics in Sedalia, Colorado, adopted an "argumentative perspective"
in viewing forensics.^ The American Forensic Association, in its 1978
meeting in Minneapolis, committed itself to "the publication of a collec
tion of essays in argumentation theory that will be reflective of the highest
scholarly standards of the Association."^ One \ ear later, the AFA and the
Speech Cominunciation Association sponsored jointly a Conference on
J. Robert Cox is Associate Professor of Speech Communication and former Di

rector of Debate at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
'Bruce E. Gronbeck,"Four Approaches to Studying Argument in Graduate Pro
grams," Journal of the American Foremic Association, 9(1972), 350.
■ II)id.

" Wayne Brockriede, "Where Is Argument?" journal of the American Forensic
Association. 11 (1975), 179-82.

'Charles Arthur Willard,"On the Utilifv of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis

and Criticism of .Arguments," Communication Monographs, 43 (1976), 308-19;
and "A Reformulation of the Concept of Argument: The Constructivist/Interactionist

Foundations of a Sociology of Argiiinent," Journal of the American Forensic Associafion, 14 (1978), 121-40.

" Daniel j. O Keefe,"Two Coticepts of Argument," Journal of the American Fo
rensic Association, 13 (1977), 121-28.

* Ray E. McKerrow, "Rhetorical Validity: An Analysis of Three Perspectives on
the Justification of Rhetorical Argument," fournal of the American Forensic Asso
ciation. 13 (1977). 133^41.

'Cf. Forensics as Communication: The Argumentative Perspective, James H.
McBath, eel. (Skokie, 111.; National Textbook Co., 1975).

"Report of the Publications Committee of the American Forensics Association,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, November 1978; cf. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard,
Advances in Argumentntkm Theory and Research (in press).
^Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation, Jack Rhodes and
Sara Newell, eds. (Salt Lake City: AFA and SCA, 1980).
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Argumentation in Salt Lake City, Utah,® and plans were made for a second
conference in August 1981. And the sixt>'-sixth annual meeting of the SCA
felt the need to olfer a "short course" in "Recent Developments in Ar

gument Theory" for debate coaches and instructors of courses in argu
mentation."^

The critical writings and pedagogy of this period are marked by a move
ment away from fonnalist views and toward a processual understanding of
human argumentation. In introducing a special issue of the/ourna/ of the
American Forensic Association devoted to argumentation theory in 1977,
I noted, "Greater concern has been displayed in viewing argumentation
as a distinct fonn of human communication—as a set of interrelationships

among audiences, social values and the giving of reasons for claims."^' By
the beginning of this decade, the study and teaching of "argument" had
come into its own.

It would seem appropriate, then, to update Gronbeck s 1972 assessment
of what is being done with argument and argumentation in our upper-

division courses.'^ The present essay offers some (anecdotal) evidence to
ward this end. My purpose is to describe the rationale for an upper-level
course, "Deliberation and the Decision-Making Process," which I teach
at UNC,and to relate this rationale to broader concerns of argumentation
theory.

Argument and "Problematic" Choice
"Deliberation and the Decision-Making Process" is a seminar for seniors

and M.A. students in the criticism of arguments used in controversial pub

lic policy decisions in late twentieth-century America. The syllabus notes
that the course places emphasis upon "the role of human symbolization
and interaction in actors' construction of justification' for particular
choices." Understanding of the nature and uses of argument are drawn
from discussion of cases in Federal regidatory rule-making, land-use de
cisions by local governmental units, and such "classic" decisions as the
U.S. decision to drop the A-bomb on Japan in 1945 and the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962.

In the process of discussing these and other cases, several questions of
theoretical interest are raised:
What does it mean to label a choice as "rational"? How are the components

of a decision problem identified and conveyed in ordinary language? Can
decision-makers ever "prove" statements about preferences and values?
What is the "logic" of prediction? And what does it mean to say that a
decision-maker has "justified" a particular course of action?

Underlying such questions is a view, of "argument" as reason-giving be
havior, the purtwse of which is the '^justification" of belief.Judgment, or
action.

Although the seminar focuses upon public policy cases, the rationale for
the study of argument is drawn from a more fundamental concern with the
"problematic" nature of human choice. The concept of choice or judgSpeech Communication Association, Sixt>--Sixth Annual Meeting, New York,
November 13, 1980.

"J. Robert Cox, Editorial Note," Journal of the American Forensic Association,
13(1977), p. 117.

The phrase "upper-division" or "upper-level" is meant to refer to courses avail
able both to seniors and graduate students.
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ment—Icrisis in Aristotle's ars rhetorica'^—has occupied a central position
in rhetorical theor>- at least since the classical Greek period. Aristotle ob
served that the questions which humans dispute, and upon which judg
ments must be pronounced, are dependent in part on factors that cannot

be known for certain, where "merely usual[probablej and contingent con
clusions must be drawn from premises of Ae same sort ...

What is

needed in such cases, then, is a method (techne) of practical judgment,
i.e., the art of rhetoric. Students gain an understanding of argument-asmethod, then, through an understanding of the problems we face in mak
ing personal and public choices.

At a second level, the process of"reason-giving" also becomes a critical

methodology students leani to employ when studying the arguments of
other actors. (I will discuss this in more detail in the last section of the

essay.) The seminar thus incorporates a dual rationale: "Argument" is a
method {techne) by which naive social actors resolve conflicts and make

choice.s and, also, a mode of explanation used by observers/critics of de
cision-making behavior.
The Nature of "Problematic" Choice

Argument, Brockriede suggests, is "a process ichereby people reason
their way from one set of problematic ideas to (he choice of another."
A description of the issues that render a choice "problematic" for social
actors thus provides one basis for instructional units in the upper-level
course in argumentation.

The 'Deliberation and the Decision-Making Process"(DDMP)seminar
describes a choice as arising from an actors perception of a "situation."
Situations are comprised of participant-defined objects, events, and value

hierarchies. Actors speak of the situation at the office," referring to their
interaction with particular persons, events, and relationships which char
acterize the component elements of the referent "the office." Similarly,
one may refer to "the energy situation," "the China situation," or, more

elliptically, "the Cold War," "a crisis of the spirit," or "public apathy."
A situation becomes "unsatisfactory" when actors perceive what Bitzer
tenns an exigence: "an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an
obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it

should be.' Such definition of situation invites reflection on the ways
and means for acting in regard to the situation in an effort to modify' its
exigence.

Though the occasion for choice arises out of an "unsatisfactory" situa
tion, not every choice is thereby a problematic one. While driving from
home to the office, a person notices a utility line blocking the intersection

But since the object of Rhetoric is judgment—for judgments are pronounced
in deliberative rhetoric and judicial proceedings are ajudginent. . .." Aristotle, The

"An" of Rhetoric, tr. John Henry Freese (London and New York, 1926), 13771j, pp.
21-22. For a discussion of Aristotle's use of kri.^is, see Edwin Black, Rhetorical
Criticism: A Study in Method (New York: Macmillan, 1965), ch. 4.

"Aristotle, The Rhetoric ofAristotle, tr. Lane Cooper(New York; Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932; paperback ed.), p. 12.
"Brockriede, p. 180.

Lloyd F. Bitzer,"The Rhetorical .Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (Win

ter 1968), 6.

.

. V
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ahead and decides (in a moment's reflection) to take Franklin instead of
South Columbia Street. And on innumerable(K'casions, actors monitortheir

actions, movements, communication, and encounters by making similar
non-problematic choices that regulate, adjust, or alter the.se situations in
a positive way.

The DDMP seminar suggests that choice becomes problematic only
when actons attribute certain qualities to a situation and to their relation

ship to it. In his discussion of Existentialism and Human Emotions, Jean
Paul Sartre relates an interesting illustration of this kind of situation.

Though cited as an example of Sartre's concept of "forlomness," the in
cident also reveals the preconditions and essential characteristics of prob
lematic choice.

The incident involved a male student in Paris who came to see Sartre

during the Nazi occupation of France in World War II. The young man s
father was on bad tenns with the mother and inclined toward collaboration

with the Germans; his older brother had been killed in the German offen
sive of 1940,and die bo),"with somewhat immature,but generous feelings,
wanted to avenge him.""" The bo> lived alone with his mother who—very
much upset over the Vichi leanings of her husband and death of her older
son—looked on the boy as her only consolation.
Sartre describes the .situation confronting hi.s student in the following
way:

The boy was faced with the choice of leaving for England and joining the
Free French Forces—that is, leaving his mother behind—or remaining with

his mother and helping her to carry on. He was fully aware that the woman
lived only for him and that his going-olT—and perhaps his death—would
plunge her into despair. He was also aware that every act that he did for
his mother's sake was a sure thing, in the sense that it was helping her to

carry on, whereas every effort he made toward going off and fighting was
an uncertain move which might run aground and prove completely useless;
for example, on his way to England he might, while passing through Spain,
be detained indefinitely in a Spanish camp; he might reach England or
Algiers and be stuck at a desk job.'®

As a result of his understanding of the situation, Sartre notes, the boy faced

two very different kinds of action: "one, concrete, immediate but concern
ing only one individual; the other concerned an incomparably vaster
group, a national collectivity, but for that very reason was dubious, and
might be interrupted en route.^"
At the .same time, Sarte explains, the boy's action rested upon his choice
between two kinds of ethics or bases for his decision. On the one hand

wa.s an "ethics of sympathy, of personal devotion;" and in choosing that
ethical perspective, he would be choosing to remain with his mother in
Paris. And, on the other, was "a broader ethics, but one whose efficacy
was more dubious."^'

Who could help the boy choose? No a priori source or decision
rule is available to the young man which assures him of tlie correct
ness of his choice. Neither Christian doctrine, utilitarian nor Kantian

"Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions (New York; Philosoph
ical Library, 1957).
'8 ibid., p. 24.
'® Ibid., pp. 24-25.
"Ibid., p. 25.
ibid.
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ethics can specify the rightness of particular action in such circumstances,
Sartre argues; "Which does the greater good, the vague act of fighting in
a group, or the concrete one of helping a particular human being to go on
living?"®-

The painful dilemma faced by Sartre's young student reveals two pre
conditions for the occurrence of problematic choice. The DDMP seminar
outlines these as:

(i) A choice is potentially problematic when an actor perceives there may
be alternate luays or means for redressing an exigence; and

(ii) A choice is potentially problematic when an actor acknowledges his
or her own self as the source of behavior in such situations.

(i) A choice is potentially problematic when an actor perceives there
may be alternate ways or meansfor redressing an exigence.
In an important sense the DDMP seminar stresses the possibility of
alternate modes of acting is not "given" in a choice situation. That is to
say simply that an actor's recognition/perception of an exigence does not,
by this fact, reveal an a priori set of"available" acts vis-a-vis this situation.

A situation that is perceived to be "unsatisfactoiy"—the death of the young
student's brother at the hands of the Gennans in 1940—presents only
"possibility" for actors' construction of alternate "ways" of believing,judg
ing, or acting. Such "ways" are indetenniiiate. They arise from the imag
ination ( with somewhat immature, but generous feelings, wanted to av

enge him"), experience, or symbolic interaction among actors/participants
rather than the "situation." Taken by itself, the construction of alternate

ways or means for acting is insufficient to render a choice problematic,
though it is die essential precondition for "choice" of any kind.
(ii) A choice is potentially problematic when an actor acknowledges his
or her own self as the .source of behavior in .such situations.

A choice becomes potentially problematic for the participants when
they cannot, or choose not to, separate choice of belief,judgment, or action
from self-as-agent. Mere recognition that alternatives are "available" does
not entail acceptance of the actor's self as the source of action. Authori
zation for action, for instance, could be invested in a transcendent source
( not my will, but Uiine ), doctrine, ediical system, or other actors. An actor

may seek to escape personal responsibilit>' of self-as-agent by attributing
causality- to environmental "forces," "conditions," or other external stimuli
("it couldn't be helped").

Acceptance of responsibility, self-a.s-agent, for acting is to acknowledge
intentionality in believing, judging, or acting. The "problem" of choice

for die young student in Vichi-controlled Paris emerged from this recog
nition; the possibilit)' of consolation or anguish for his mother, of aid to
the Free French Forces, began in his acceptance of himself as the agent
of his acts. The boy was responsible not only for his acts but for choosing
the basis on which his ultimate decision rested.

The beginning of problematic choice, thus, lies in Sartre's advice to his

young student: "[Iln coining to see me he knew the answer I was going
to give him, and I had only one answer to give: 'You're free, choose, that
is, invent.""

«Ibid.

"Ibid., p. 28.
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An actor's perception/construction of alternate "available" ways or
means for acting and acknowledgment of self-as-agent (intentionality) are
the essential preconditions of problematic choice. Action that is taken to

modify an exigence becomes truly problematic when, in addition to these,
one of the following conditions is present:

(Hi) intra- or interpersonal conflict among preferred ends of acting;
(iv) inadequate knowledge regarding the consequences of acting;
(v) absence of a priori means for assessing the correctness of acting in
a particular situation.
Each of these attributes of a choice "situation" serves as tlie basis for a

unit of study in the DDMP seminar: (iii) argumentation regarding actors'
preferences andlor values, (iv) the "logic" of prediction in situations in
volving risk or uncertainty; and (v) the nature of "decision rules."
(iii) The possibility for acting becomes problematic when the ends(outcomeslconsequences) desired by an actor or actors are perceived to be
mutually unattainable.
The occurrence either of intra- or inter-personal conflict among pre
ferred ends forestalls habituated responses to an unsatisfactory situa
tion. Such conflict may involve the pursuit of two or more outcomes,
both or all of which are desired but which require mutually exclusive

acts. Desire for revenge of his older brother could be pursued by Sartre's
student only at tlie expense of leaving his mother behind. Conflict
arises from his full awareness that the woman "lived only for him and
that his going-off—and perhaps his death—would plunge her into de
spair.""

Interpersonally, conflict also may exist among actors' assessment of the
same ends (consequences) or in the hierarchical ordering of these ends.

Wliich is the more important? Honor/revenge or personal devotion/obli
gation?

Choice becomes problematic, then, in that it is value-laden. Actors, in

acknowledging themselves as agents, confront multiple and often conflict
ing preferences that are associated with the possibilities of acting. In a
similar sense, they face alternate bases for the justification of concrete
preferences. The student in Sartre's narration was "wavering between
two kinds of ethics": one of personal devotion, and the otlier of collective

obligation (patriotism, honor,duty to country). Though he was"free, Sartre
advised, he was responsible for the construction (invention) of reasons for
his choice of ethical grounding. In general,the DDMP seminar stresses ar

gument's function to be (a) this "situated" assessment of ends (conse
quences) of alternative courses and (b) the reconciliation of plural and,
often, conflicting evaluations or ethical bases of choice.

(iv) Choice becomes problematic when an actor or actors have inade
quate knowledge regarding the consequences of the possible ways and
means of acting in a situation.

A "problem" of decision-making arises when individual actors do not
know which of several outcomes of an action will eventually prevail. Even

where actors agree upon the end to be sought, it is often not clear which
of the several available acts will most likely secure it. The young student's

desire to join the Free French Forces was "dubious," in Sartre's words,

precisely because its possibility depended upon contingent acts of agents
over whom the boy had little control: "for example, on his way to England
Ibid., p. 24.
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he might, while passing through Spain, he detained indefinitely in a Span
ish camp; he might reach England or Algiers and be stuck in an office at
a desk job."^®

The relation between actors' knowledge of contingent events ajid action
is such that judgment must be based upon non-compelling reasons. Often
choice of practical belief or action must be taken on the basis of:
incomplete, conflicting, or less than totally veracious sources of informa
tion; and

rival hypotheses or explanations of the relevant causal features of a .situa
tion, system, or state of affairs.

The DDMP seminar encourages students to explore those bases upon
which actors make judgments regarding the completeness, veracity, or ac
curacy of reports, and of the plausibility of explanations about contingent
states, Such investigation also includes the study of actors' definitions of

sufficient grounds tor belief or "good reasons" tor their prediction of the
consequences (ends) of action. Argument which addresses such problem
atic judgments, students learn, is marked by uucertainty, i.e., actors maylack either knowledge of or control over those events which render their
conclusions "merely usual [probable] and contingent."^®

(v) Choice becomes problematic in the absence of agreed upon means
for determining the "correctness" of belief or action in a particular sit
uation.

The DDMP seminar observes that, to the extent actors' choices are in

tentional and precede from alternative ways or means for redressing an
exigence, decision-makers (or their constituents) insist that some basis ex

ist for importcUit choices. One believes or does x and not y or z because
there exist "good" or "sufficient" reasons for x. Intentional choice, then,
because it is not detennined by causes, forces, or stimuli in the usual sense

of these terms, is ordinarily expected to be justified.
One of the major instructional units in the DDMP seminar thus is the

study of "decision rules" or grounds of actors' integration of the various
elements of choice and the justification of particular acts. For ordinary,
repetitive, or non-problematical decisions—as eating, dressing, njovement,
or much of our social communication, for example—actors evolve habits,
customs, rules, or other informal guides. Such habituated decision guides
permit easy, fairly rapid, and satisfactory "solutions" to ways of behaving
in predictable situations. Because they ordinarily and regularly address
the exigence of a situation in satisfactory ways, they provide "sufficient"
grounds for one's actions.

The DDMP seminar suggests that, in a similiu- manner, actors—individ
ually and as members of larger collectivities—evolve rules, principles,
models, and maxims of "correct"judgment and behavior. We invoke prin
ciples of Christian doctrine ("love thy neighbor as thyself'), Kantian or
utilitarian ethics ("never treat any person as a means, but as iui end"; "the
greatest good for the greatest number"), or social proverbs and maxims
("better safe than sorry"; "nothing ventured, nothing gained") to regulate

our personal and public relationships. We commonly call upon "national
security" in times of international crisis. Policy is promulgated, criticized,
and revised in the name of "social welfare," "justice," or the maximization
of "utility."
Ibid., p. 25.
Cooper, tr., p. 12.
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Importantly, what actors refer to as a correct or rational decision is lo
cated neither in the situation nor in tlie act itself; rather, it is discovered

in the actor or actors resorting to the appropriate standard ofjudgment for
that action. In cases of non-problematic choice, this usually means that
those making the decision agree that the rule, principle, or standard is

"appropriate" and that, in invoking it in this particular context, it justifies
one manner of acting rather than another. Both detenninatioirs, the DDMP
seminar is careful to note, are actor-defined judgments.
Actors' resource to rules, principles, or maxims may, nevertheless, prove

in itself to be problematic in reaching a decision. Two sources of difficulty
are outlined in tlie DDMP seminar:

conflict regarding which of several apparently relevant, though inconsis
tent, rules or principles apply in the case at hand; and

inability to operationalize an agreed-upon rule or principle in making a
choice among particular acts.

"Justification" of belief or action assumes that actors have agreed both

upon the appropriateness of a rule and on its validation of one of several
ways of believing or acting in the particular situation. Such agreement
seldom can be secured on a priori grounds. Who could help his young
.student choose?, asks Sartre.
Christian doctrine? No. Christian dcKtrine says, "Be charitable, love your
neighbor, take the more rugged path, etc., etc." But which is the more

rugged path? Whom should he love as a brother? The fighting man or his
mother? Which does the greater good, the vague act of fighting in a group,
or the concrete one of helping a particular human being to go on living?
Who can decide a priori? Nobody.^"

Choice, students leam, is historically-bounded; that is, it is enacted in
a particular situation in time. Because a choice must be appropriate to its
"situation," agreement may be lacking either in what constitutes a correct
rule of deciding or in its manner of application to the range of particular
acts. A means for validating thought and action which removes choice from
the realm ofthe problematic also removes choice from its historical setting.
Again, the attention of the seminar is directed to those "reasons" which
situated actors find acceptable in interpreting abstract values or rules in
concrete choice.

Throughout, the DDMP seminar voices a concern for the explanation
of significant human choices, i.e., for the justifications historical actors put
forth or to which they assent in situations of problematic belief and action.
Such an understanding of "explanation" differs from the study of choice
behavior in psychology and some communication courses in important
ways. It may be useful to explore this difference further.
Argument and Explanation
The DDMP seminar holds that human choice is intentional behavior

and, therefore, distinguishes "reasons" given for choosing or deciding (x
rather than y) from causal antecedents of x. This distinction is similar to
that drawn by Oldencjuist:
When we say that Jones chose x for the sake of z, or in order to obtain z,
we are not saying that some event preceded and caused i. What we are
asserting is that Jones considered x to be more suitable than y for the
"Sartre, p. 25.
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attainment of z. It may be the case that some set of events precedes and
causes action x, but that is not anything we assert when we give a reason
for

What the DDMP seminar assumes, therefore, is an alternative under
standing or explanation ofchoice behavior to a covering-law (causal) model
of behavior. At the immediate level of analysis, students are concerned

with the reasons naive social actors find acceptable" for believing,judg
ing, or doing x. In the process, what is "explained" is not the occurrence
of some belief or action, a matter of causalit>', but the groutids on which
actors find such belief or action "acceptable," "rational," or "justified."
This mode of explanation closely resembles what Taylor has Iai>elled
"reason-giving" explanation to distinguish it from "scientific" (causal) ex
planation.^" Monge offers this description:
"Rea.son-giving explanations" account for why certain phenomena occur by
showing why a person thought that a particular acHon or belief was right,
correct, true, or a good thing to do. It often answers to the question of why

a person felt that a particular action was a good thing to do rather than why
the action did in fact occur.. . . Thus, reason-giving explanations allow us
to assess a person s behavior in terms of the evaluative views he holds
preceding his action ... .^^

The terms reason, "reasonable," and "reason-giving behavior" incor
porate the assumptions of actors' constniction of alternate ways of believ
ing and acting and, furtlier, the view of persons as agents (sources) oftheir
own acts,

At a .second level, then, "reason-giving" serves as a methodology which
students employ in observing/assessing the arguments advanced for and
against important choices. Typically, students reach judgments about the
wisdom, correctness, rationality, or appropriateness of some concrete de
cision, e.g., President Truman's July 24, 1945, order to General Spaatz to
use an atomic bomb against the Japanese as soon after August 3rd as weath
er permitted. In supporting an evaluation of the wisdom, sav, of this de
cision, students seek "reasons" which invoke the critical niles, principles,
or criteria appn)priate to the audience whose assent is sought. Such an

audience may be simply the immediate assembly of students and professor
or, more removed, an hypothesized audience of "scholars" or wider com
munity of "all reasonable persons."^'

Thus "argument," as a form of reason-giving behavior, is seen both as

a phenomenon which students may observe and as the mode of expla
nation best suited to accomplishing this task.
Summary

A seminar in argumentation theory qua theory necessarily makes certain

assumptions about its subject matter: What is the nature of the phenom-

"Andrew 01denqui.st, "Choosing, Deciding, and Doing," in Paul Edwards, ed..
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, v. 2(New York; Macmillan and The Free Press
[Reprinted], 1972), p. 99.

"Daniel M. Taylor, Explanation and Meaning {Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press. 1970).

'0 Peter R. Monge, "Theory Construction in the Study of Communication: The
Systems Paradigm," Jounia/ of Connnunication, 23(1973), 7-8.

Cf. Ch. Perelmaii and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on
Argumentation, tr, John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame and London:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), esp. pp. 31-35.
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enon being studied? What is "explained" when one investigates this phe
nomenon? What mode of explanation is most suited to undertaking this
task?

"Deliberation and the Decision-Making Process" takes as its central

subject the study of arguments advanced for and against important public
policy choices in late twentieth-century America. "Argument" is defined
as reason-giving behavior whose purpose is the "justification of belief,

judgment, or action. The investigation of argumentative behavior draws
its rationale from more fundamental concerns about the nature of prob
lematic choice. In seeking to "explain" the decisions arrived at in contro
versial cases, students are concerned with describing the reasons advanced
on a host of issues:

judgments regarding the desired or preferred ends(consequences)of belief
or action;

judgments of the relative importance of values (especially in instances in
which values clash in concrete choices);

Judgments about the probable occurrence of contingent events and the
consequences of one's acts; and

judgments regarding the rules, principles, or guides which actors invoke
to "justify" one choice rather than another.

Judgments of this nature are "problematic" because they rest upon

grounds or "reasons" which are non-compelling, i.e., they do not force
one's conclusions.

In seeking a mode of explanation appropriate to their evaluation of the
"reasonableness" of key decisions, and of the tuguments on which such
choices depend,.students construct reasons themselves. Such reasons ex

plain why a particular choice was reached by showing why a person
thought it was "right, correct, true, or a good thing to do. The study of
argument and argumentation thus is concerned not with the causes of
personal or public decisions, but with the viability (justification) of such
decisions.
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